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Predictability Versus Flexibility: The
Conflict in Conflict of Laws
C ONFLICT OF LAWS abounds with great complexity, uncertainty,
and confusion.1 The myriad problems that can arise have
proliferated in recent decades as a direct result of the interstate
mobility that man has achieved through modern transportation.
This has caused a corresponding increase in the legal consequences
flowing from the transactions and occurrences in which persons
participate. The purpose of this Note is to focus upon the legal
significance of interstate activities as they affect tort liability. In
particular, the question sought to be answered relates to .the choice
of which law a forum should apply when faced with a multi-state
occurrence resulting in injury.
The policies and principles employed to justify the application
of foreign law have been the object of scholarly attention for many
years.' The essential purpose of applying the law of another juris-
diction rather than the forum's own law stems from the forum's
desire to attain a uniformity of decision no matter where the cause
of action is maintained.' This result, if achieved, will prevent the
I Currie, Conflict, Crises, and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1.
2 Story explained the application of foreign law as based on the "comity" theory:
A state may prohibit the operation of all foreign laws, and the rights grow-
ing out of them, within its own territories. It may prohibit some foreign
laws, and it may admit the operation of others. It may recognize, and
modify, and qualify some foreign laws; it may enlarge, or give universal
effect to others. It may interdict the administration of some foreign laws;
it may favor the introduction of others. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 34 (4th
ed. 1852).
Mr. Justice Holmes, in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), advo-
cated the "vested rights" theory:
The theory . . . is that although the act complained of was subject to no
law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation. . . which, like
other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the
person may be found .... But as the only source of this obligation is the
law of the place of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely
the existence of the obligation . . . but equally determines its extent. Id.
at 126.
The "local law" theory was expressed by Learned Hand, District Judge, in Direction
Der Discont o-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1924):
It is indeed commonly said that, when a court must consider the legal effect
of events happening elsewhere, it enforces foreign law. That I conceive is a
compressed statement, which it is at times useful to expand. Of necessity no
court can enforce the law of another place. It is, however, the general law
of all civilized peoples that, in adjusting the rights of suitors, courts will
impute to them rights and duties similar to those which arose in the place
where the relevant transactions occurred. Id. at 744.
a See Cheatham, American Theories of Conflicts of Laws: Their Role and Utility,
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litigants from "forum shopping" for a jurisdiction most favorable to
their position.4 Once a determination is made that a state other
than the forum is involved in a transaction or occurrence, then the
question presented is whether or not this fact requires the applica-
tion of foreign law.5
I. THE PREVAILING VIEw:
THE PLACE OF INJURY GOVERNS
A. Lex Loci Delicti: Rationale
Whenever a tort is committed and contacts with a state other
than .the forum are present, a possibility of conflict arises.' Tradi-
tionally, the courts have held that the law of the place of injury
will govern the liability of the parties concerned.7 This application
of law is based upon the vested rights theory of a cause of action:'
that the right to recover for a foreign tort is created by and de-
pendent upon the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred.'
Those who espouse the vested rights approach consider it best to
determine the legal effects of a foreign occurrence in this manner
since it affords certainty and ease in application."0 If the place of
58 HARv. L REv. 361 (1945); Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE LJ. 457 (1924); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Con-flict of Laws, 33 YALE LJ. 736 (1924).
4 See Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156 (1930).
5 See Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of
Laws, 50 COLUM L REv. 881 (1950), in which he suggests the criteria which should
be employed in the choice of law problems. He stresses the necessity of vigilance in
conflict of laws to keep abreast of the complex changes occurring in the modern world.
6Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems - Torts, 48 CORNELL
LQ. 215 (1963).
7 This view is in accord with RSTATmmT, CONFLCr OF LAws § 377 (1934)
which states: "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." Moreover, the subsequent section
states: "The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a
legal injury." Id. § 378 (1934).
8 As early as 1923, the rejection of the vested rights theory was suggested by
Judge Learned Hand:
[No court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and, when
a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only
evoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under
civilized law imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possi-
ble to that arising in the place where the tort occurs. Guinness v. Miller,
291 Fed. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff'd sub nom. Hicks v. Guinness, 269
U.S. 71 (1925).
9 See Cavers, Comment: The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822,
823-24 (1950) for an explanation of the "vested rights" approach and the criticism
by Judge Hand and Professor Cook which led to its rejection.
10 CARtozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw (1924) states that judicial development
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
injury is a foreign jurisdiction, the forum will look only to the
substantive law of that state to determine the rights of the parties,
all procedural determinations being made by the forum."
It appears upon initial consideration that this technique presents
a reasonable basis upon which a choice of applicable law can be
made due to its inherent predictability and certainty.' This is true,
however, only if all elements of the occurrence originate in one
state and the applicable foreign law presents no conflict with the
public policy of the forum state. If there is a multi-state occur-
rence, the rigid application of the place of injury loses its effective-
ness,'3 for pragmatically, where a number of jurisdictions have
contact with the occurrence, each will have some degree of interest
in the outcome of the litigation, and therefore a predetermined
reference to the place of injury can and most often will produce
an unfair and harsh result.'4
B. Unjust Results by Use of the Place of Injury
A leading case illustrating the inequities flowing from the pre-
vailing "place of injury" test is Carter v. Tillery. 5 All the parties
were residents of Texas, and the accident occurred during an air-
plane flight from New Mexico to Texas. The plane deviated from
its course and was forced to land on a dirt road in Mexico. In at-
tempting to take off, the plane crashed, causing physical injury to
one of its passengers. A suit alleging negligence was brought in
Texas. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction, finding
that the law of Mexico applied since it was the place of injury.'"
However, since the remedies provided by Mexican law were so
dissimilar, the court lacked jurisdiction, refused to hear the case,
and the plaintiff was without a remedy.'
requires both change and caution and that "it is easier to follow the beaten track than
it is to dear another." Id. at 62.
",See, e.g., Otey v. Midland Valley R.R., 108 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921);
Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185
N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
12 See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959,
969 (1952); Comment, 61 COLtIM. L REv. 1497 (1961).
13 Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (R.D. Wash. 1955).
14 Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468
(1928). The author states: "The vice of the vested rights theory is that it affects to
decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the practical considerations
involved ...... Id. at 482-83.
15 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).




Similarly, in Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 8 the plaintiff, a
citizen and resident of Arkansas, was injured in Saudi Arabia by
the defendant's truck. The defendant was incorporated in Dela-
ware, licensed to do business in New York, and engaged in business
in Saudi Arabia. Evidence was presented from which it was infer-
able that under New York law, the defendant was negligent. How-
ever, the plaintiff did not allege Saudi Arabian law nor did he offer
to prove it. The court held that since the place of injury was
Saudi Arabia, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead and
prove the foreign law, and since he had failed to do either, the
directed verdict of the trial court was affirmed. 9
In both Carter and Walton, the reference to foreign law in-
volved the determination of the law of a foreign country. Never-
theless, the problem of inequitable results can arise where there are
interstate contacts and the arbitrary choice of law is the place of
injury." For example, in Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Carroll,"' the
plaintiff, a resident of Alabama, was employed by the defendant
railroad, an Alabama corporation operating a line from Chatta-
nooga, Tennessee, through Alabama to Meridian, Mississippi. The
plaintiff, a brakeman on a train running from Birmingham, Ala-
bama, to Meridian, was injured in Mississippi when a link between
two cars broke. The defendant's inspector had failed to examine
the links at the journey's starting point in Alabama. Mississippi
permitted no recovery due to their acceptance of the common law
fellow-servant doctrine, but by statute in Alabama2 such recovery
was permissible. The court concluded that there could be no re-
18233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
19Id. at 545. For a good discussion of Walton, see Currie, On Displacement of
the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUMb. L. REV. 964 (1958).
20 In Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cit. 1940), an action for
wrongful death was brought in a federal district court in New York. The deceased
died in Ohio as a result of eating unwholesome canned meat which he had purchased
in Ohio. The defendant, a New York distributor, had secured the meat from a con-
cern which had processed and canned it in South America. The defendant sold the
product to a wholesaler in Ohio who in turn sold it to the grocer from whom the
deceased had purchased the item. An Ohio statute made it negligence per se to sell
unwholesome food without disclosure of that fact to the buyer. Held: Plaintiff may
recover by showing a violation of the statute and need not prove lack of due care. Thus,
in many cases the place of injury rule works quite well.
2197 Ala. 126 (1892).
2 21d. at 134. The present statute, under the state's workmen's compensation plan,
also abrogates the common law fellow-servant defense unless the employer elects to
come under the plan and the employee does not. See ALA. CODE. tit. 26, §§ 254, 256
(1958).
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
covery since the injuries were sustained in Mississippi even though
the negligent act occurred in Alabama.28
The hardship embodied in this type of result is more apparent
when the practicalities of such a decision are examined. For exam-
ple, if the accident in the Alabama case had occurred at a different
point along the track, perhaps only a few minutes prior, the plaintiff
could have recovered, assuming he was fortunate enough to be pres-
ent in a state permitting recovery at the moment of injury. This
fact alone does not seem sufficient to justify use of the vested
rights theory as a basis for the determination of rights and lia-
bilities. 2
4
C. Vagueness of the Substantive-Procedural Characterization
The possibility of an unjust result is not the only weakness
inherent in the prevailing view. The determination of what is
substantive and what is procedural presents numerous inconsisten-
cies.25 If uniformity of result is the main justification for adhering
to the place of injury rule, this dichotomy has not proven an effec-
tive means of attaining uniformity.26 The characterization as sub-
stantive or procedural is always made by the forum in its own
terms and according to its own standards.2 However, the diversity
of opinion as to what is substantive or procedural indicates that
the courts will manipulate this device most often to avoid the
"place of injury" rule where its application would be unreason-
able.2
8
28 97 AIa. at 140.
24The instances of such unfair results are numerous. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Power
Plant Eng'r Co., 216 Ore. 12, 337 P.2d 313 (1959). See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
25 See text accompanying note 31 infra.
26 For a clarification of this assertion, see text accompanying notes 60-74 infra.
27 See RESTATEMENT, CONFUCr OF LAWS § 584, 585 (1934). See also Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALt L.J. 333, 344 (1933)
in which he suggests the following test to determine whether a given rule of law is
to be considered substantive or procedural: "How far can the court of the forum go
in applying the rules taken from the foreign system of law without unduly hindering
or inconveniencing itself?" Cf. Comment, 47 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1934).
2 8 This was apparent in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953),
where the plaintiff and others were injured in Arizona when their car collided with
the automobile of the deceased. The subsequent negligence action, brought in Cali-
fornia, sought damages from the administrator of the deceased's estate. Under Arizona
law, the survival of the action would not be permitted; however, California law is to
the contrary. Judge Traynor spoke for the court and asserted that the characterization
as substance or procedure is made according to the nature of the problem for which
the characterization must be made. Id. at 865, 264 P.2d at 948. Though there was
contrary authority which characterized "survival of actions" as substantive, Judge Tray-
[VoL 18: 938
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The New York courts became the leaders in what might be
called the decline of the lex loci delicti test. What had been done
in Grant v. McAuliffe29 was furthered and expanded by the New
York Court of Appeals in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.30
However, like the California court in Grant, the New York court
merely undermined the place of injury rule without rejecting it
completely. The court rejected holdings asserting that the measure
of damages was a question of substantive law and expressed its
desire to promote the interests of its state in spite of demands for
uniformity and predictability.!1
Immediately following Kilberg, a federal court was faced with
the same problem in a diversity case,"2 and on rehearing3 the court
adopted the Kilberg approach, stating that the question for deci-
sion was whether a federal court sitting in New York could consti-
tutionally "apply" a Massachusetts statute creating a right of action
nor implied that each case must turn on its own peculiar facts. See Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEcAS L RExv. 657, 670 (1959), where he says his de-
cision in Grant was based on the impressive contacts with California.
In Greenberg v. Panama Transp. Co., 185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960), the court
said:
It is usually assumed that in connection with the tort of interfering with
advantageous contract relations, as in connection with torts generally, the gov-
erning law is supplied by the law of the place where the tort occurs....
But the grounds of logic, history, convenience and policy which support the
doctrine in many cases, particularly cases of physical injury, are not appro-
priately invoked in every type of case. Different torts may be governed by
different principles of conflict of laws .... And the conflict of laws rules
governing even the particular tort of interference with advantageous contrac-
tual relations may depend upon what type of contract relationship is said to
have been impeded. Id. at 324.
This type of reasoning cannot be considered a rejection of the place of injury test;
rather it constitutes a weak attempt to retain the rule in form yet circumvent its sub-
stantive rigidity.
29 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See also authorities cited note 28 supra.
80 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
31 In Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17
(1962), the court retracted the "procedural" basis of the Kilberg decision. The cited
case concerned an action for the wrongful death of New York domiciliaries who were
involved in an automobile collision in Maryland. A New York statute (N.Y. DECED.
EsT. LAW § 132) provides that a judgment for the plaintiff in a wrongful death action
shall include interest from the date of death. Maryland law does not authorize pre-
judgment interest. The court of appeals held that the New York statute could not
properly be applied to provide for the inclusion of interest in the judgment and that
the Kilberg decision "must be held merely to express this state's strong public policy
with respect to limitations in wrongful death actions." Id. at 395, 183 N.E.2d at 904,
230 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
2 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing,
309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). The action concerned the same airplane crash involved
in Kilberg and again the claim was made that the Massachusetts limitation on recovery
should govern since it was the place of injury.
33 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
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for wrongful death and yet refuse, because of New York state
policy, to follow a provision of the statute which would limit the
amount of recovery.3 4 The court held that New York had sufficient
interests in the multi-state transaction so that the state could exer-
cise the power to develop a conflict of laws doctrine, 5 and it was
further held that the failure to recognize the Massachusetts limita-
tion was not a violation of the full-faith-and-credit clause of the
United States Constitution. In support of its position, the court
cited Supreme Court decisions 6 holding that either the state in
which the impact occurs - usually considered the locus of the
tort - or (where different) the state in which the wrongful act
or omission occurs, may constitutionally apply its wrongful death
law to the transaction."
A number of other cases" have resolved similar problems by
employing the technique utilized in Kilberg and Pearson v. North-
east Airlines, Inc.9 These decisions have upset the "desired uni-
34 Id. at 555.
35 Tbid. The forum state's interest in the multistate transaction may be relevant
not only to the state's constitutional right to apply its own law but also to its choice
of law, if it follows the significant contacts theory rather than mechanical choice of
law rules.
36Id. at 563, citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
37 Id. at 15.38 See Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) which
also involved a suit for wrongful death resulting from the same plane crash. In this
case the decedent, his widow, and their infant children had been domiciled in New
York. One month after the accident the widow and children moved to Maryland,
where they acquired a domicile. The district court found that if the suit had been
brought in Maryland, the Maryland courts would have applied the Massachusetts meas-
ure of damages. The court applied the Massachusetts, rather than the New York,
measure of damages, stating that the New York courts would not have afforded the
widow and children better treatment than they would receive from the courts of their
own state, which was freely chosen as their domicile long before this suit was com-
menced. Id. at 54. In Turner v. Capitol Motors Transp. Co., 214 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Me. 1963), an action for wrongful death arose out of an automobile accident in
Massachusetts. Both decedents were Maine residents, and the defendant was a Massa-
chusetts corporation. Since the time of Kilberg, the Massachusetts wrongful death
statute had been amended to limit recovery to twenty thousand dollars. The court
did not directly pass upon the merits of Kilberg. It held that Massachusetts law
should be applied since the Massachusetts limitation upon the amount of recovery in
wrongful death could not be considered contrary to the policy of Maine which limited
recovery in wrongful death actions to thirty thousand dollars.
39 As a footnote to the Pearson decision, Judge Kaufman in his dissent discussed
Kilberg and said:
It may still be argued that in Kilberg, by striking one of the Massachusetts
rules governing liability, the court left a vacuum on the question of limitation
which could not prevent a plaintiff from recovering in excess of the missing$15,000 limit. A more attractive explanation is that once the court struck
the limitation provision, it filled the resulting void with a rule of law allow-
ing unlimited recovery, created by the court on the model of the New York
[Vol. 18: 938
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formity" which the vested rights theory is supposed to generate.40
This departure was not made without purpose, and it is obvious
that the courts were merely seeking to avoid the consequences envi-
sioned in situations similar to Carter and Walton.41 The substance-
procedure device therefore became a handy tool to engraft a legal
fiction or exception upon the lex loci delicti concept while still
claiming adherence to its basic principle.
D. Various Interpretations of the "Place of Injury"
The prevailing view has another weakness which the courts
exploit, when necessary, to apply the law of a jurisdiction other
than the actual situs of the injury. This is accomplished by treating
the place of "conduct" as the sits of the wrong and then applying
that jurisdiction's law.42 A recent Minnesota decision refused to
follow the Restatement view" and instead applied the law of the
place of the tortious conduct, stating that this "would be more in
conformity with principles of equity and justice."'44 The court con-
sidered Minnesota's interests in the transaction and concluded that
the defendant was not burdened by any greater responsibility than
was intended by the statute.45 A Massachusetts alienation of affec-
wrongful death statute. Although this may be a matter of semantics, since
the result is the same under either analysis, I have chosen the latter theory
because it is more conducive to the constitutional analysis. Pearson v. North-
east Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir.) rev'd on rehearing, 309
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
40 See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra. It is evident from the diversity of
opinions that the courts recognize the pitfalls of the traditional place of injury rules.
41 Ibid.
4 2 See Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938), which
was overruled by McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939).
A direct action statute controlled, based on where the negligent conduct occurred rather
than the place of injury, which did not recognize the right. A fairly recent action,
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), involved
the proprietor of a Minnesota establishment who had sold alcohol to a person whose
intoxicated condition was alleged to have been the proximate cause of the injuries the
plaintiff sustained in a Wisconsin automobile accident Minnesota has a dram shop
act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.45 (1957), permitting a civil action against an inn-
keeper, although Wisconsin does not therefore, the defendant claimed that since Wis-
consin was the place of injury, its law should govern the substantive rights and lia-
bilities of the parties. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., supra at 379, 82 N.W.2d at
367.
43 See note 7 supra.
44 Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 380, 82 N.W.2d 365, 368
(1957).
45 Id. at 381, 82 N.W.2d at 368. Here all the parties were residents of Minne-
sota, and the defendant was licensed under its laws and required to operate its estab-
lishment in compliance with those laws. The violation of the Minnesota statute oc-
carred in Minnesota, and the wrongful conduct was complete within this state when
the individual became intoxicated before leaving the establishment.
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tion action, Gordon v. Parker,46 was cited by the court to support
its decision." There the plaintiff and his wife were domiciled in
Pennsylvania; the alleged wrongful conduct occurred in Massa-
chusetts. The court applied its own law by characterizing the
"wrong" as occurring in Massachusetts. As dictum the court iden-
tified the policies of each state, asserting that Pennsylvania, the
domicile of the parties, had an interest, but it was outweighed
by the interests sought to be furthered in Massachusetts, the place
of the wrongful conduct.48
Thus, like Kilberg, the court in Gordon recognized that policy
considerations should enter into the resolution of conflicts of laws.
The two cases differed in the manner of avoiding the place of in-
jury concept, but their rationales were identical. Thus, by consid-
ering the wrong as having occurred in a place other than the
actual situs of the tort, a fair and equitable result was achieved.
E. Reclassification
As the courts gradually engrafted exception after exception upon
the traditional rule so as to justify the use of a jurisdiction other
than the place of injury for choice of law purposes," a more subtle
approach was devised to accomplish the same result. Denominated
reclassification, this approach is in fact merely another method of
characterizationt0 but not of the same type as employed in Kilberg,
for it involves the characterization of a given problem as one not
arising out of tort. As a result, a new conflicts principle is brought
forward using law other than that of the place of the injury."'
One of the early cases to use this technique52 involved a colli-
sion in Massachusetts caused by the alleged negligence of the Con-
necticut defendant who had leased the car to the driver. If the
place of injury rule were applied, there could be no recovery. How-
ever, the Connecticut forum characterized the problem as a "contract
of leasing" entered into in Connecticut. Further, the Connecticut
4683 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).
47 Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 381-82, 82 N.W.2d 365, 368-69
(1957).
4883 F. Supp. at 42.
49 See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 NYE.2d 597 (1936).
50 There is perhaps more validity to this analysis than is found in the "substance-
procedure" type of characterization. The wide diversity of opinion with respect to the
latter is much more obvious.
5 See, e.g., Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
52 Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Ad. 163 (1928).
[Vol 18: 938
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statute" permitting recovery from the automobile's owner for its
negligent operation by another was said to have become part of
the contract when executed.'
Other cases have reclassified the basic problem from tort to
family law5 in determining the question of intra-family immunity.
In Haumshild -v. Continental Cas. Co., 6 the Wisconsin court re-
jected the view of the first Restatement" and applied the law of
the domicile, thus overruling a long line of cases." Wisconsin per-
mitted one spouse to sue the other, whereas California, the place
of injury, prohibited such suits. Therefore, the court characterized
the problem as one of family law and applied the standard rule
that the law of the domicile governs such matters.
II. THE INCEPTION OF THE NEW RULE:
GROUPING OF CONTACTS THEORY
It is apparent that the decisions invoking legal niceties to avoid
the place of injury rule leave the traditional approach devoid of
any real effect. The various means employed to circumvent the
rule evidence the need for a radical departure. The substance-
procedure device merely skirts the issue by seemingly retaining the
lex loci delicti but avoiding its application through the forum's
inherent right to make the characterization as it sees fit. Similarly,
the public policy defense utilized by a forum adds confusion and
perpetuates legal fictions. As these same inadequacies are present
in the reclassification method, it is not surprising that dissatisfaction
with the place of injury as the sole reference in tort conflict ques-
tions has been under serious attack.59
53 CONN. GHiN. STAT. ANN. § 14-154 (1960).
IS4 Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 337, 143 Ad. 163,
164 (1928).
55 See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,289 P.2d 218 (1955).
56 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). A Wisconsin wife sued her husband
for injuries sustained in a California motor truck accident.
57 See note 7 supra.
58 7 Wis. 2d at 138-39, 95 N.W.2d at 818. The court in Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C.
698, 129 S.E.2d 303 (1964) asserted that the Haumshild decision did not overrule
Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931) because the former dealt
with the capacity to sue rather than with the existence of a cause of action. The lan-
guage of Hauashild seems to indicate otherwise. Both cases involved the right of the
wife to sue her husband.
59 E.g., Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading
Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Morris, The Proper Law of a
Tort, 64 HARV. L Riv. 881 (1951); Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's
Estrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845 (1961).
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A. Rejection of Lex Loci Delicti
It was not until 1963 that a clear rejection of the prevailing
view emerged. A New York court in Babcock v. Jackson" an-
nounced the "grouping of contacts" theory. The significance of
this decision lies in its express refusal to follow the traditional
approach to conflict of laws or to compromise with the approach
by invoking further exceptions to the outdated rule.6 In Babcock
the plaintiff and defendant, both residents of Rochester, New York,
left Rochester in the defendant's car for a trip to Canada. While
driving in Ontario the defendant lost control of the vehicle and it
subsequently careened into a wall, injuring the plaintiff. Ontario
law provided that the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other
than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers, is
not liable for any loss or damage resulting from injury to, or the
death of, any person being transported in the motor vehicle.62 The
court rejected the lex loci delicti rule for its failure to consider
the implications arising from relevant policy considerations.6" The
court found support for this concept in Kilberg which stressed
public policy" and also in Auten v. Auten65 wherein the court
had rejected the traditional conflicts rule for contracts and adopted
instead a grouping of contacts test.66 Further support was af-
forded by the Restatement " which now rejects the lex loci delicti
60 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
61 Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52.
6 2 ONT. REV. STAT. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
63 12 N.Y.2d at 478, 191 N.E.2d at 281,240 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
64 The use of public policy to determine the conflict of laws is particularly evident
in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), where Mr.
Justice Stone stated.
The probability is slight that injured workmen, once returned to California,
would be able to retrace their steps to Alaska, and there successfully prose-
cute their claims for compensation. Without a remedy in California, they
would be remediless, and there was the danger that they might become public
charges, both matters of grave public concern to the state.
California, therefore, had a legitimate public interest in controlling and
regulating this employer-employee relationship .... [The conflict is to
be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause,
compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those
of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdic-
tion, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight... [0 nly
if it appears that, in the conflict of interests which have found expression in
the conflicting statutes, the interest of Alaska is superior to that of California,
is there rational basis for denying to the courts of California the right to
apply the laws of their own state. Id. at 542-49.
65 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
66 Id. at 160-61, 124 N.E.2d at 101-02.
6 7
R.3STATBMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 371 (Tent Draft No. 8, 1963).
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rule and adopts instead the general rule that the "local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the occur-
rence and the parties determines their tights and liabilities in tort""
Relying primarily on these authorities, the court in Babcock
held that the law to be applied in resolving a particular issue in
a tort action with numerous jurisdictional contacts is "the law of
the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with
the occurrence or the parties has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation.""u Arriving at its conclusion
as to which jurisdiction had the greatest concern with the issue of
a driver's liability to his passenger for ordinary negligence, the
court examined the contacts7" and relationships of the parties with
New York and Ontario. It was pointed out that while the accident
did occur in Ontario, both the parties were New York residents,
the host-guest relationship arose in New York, the car was regis-
tered and insured in New York and the trip was to begin and
end in New York
The court then evaluated these contacts in light of the under-
lying policies of New York and Ontario with regard to their re-
spective tort rules concerning the liability of a driver to his pas-
sengers. The policy behind the Ontario statute was stated to be
the protection of Ontario insurers against fraudulent claims.71 Since
neither an Ontario insurer nor an Ontario resident was involved,
the court reasoned that Ontario had no concern with that issue.72
The court asserted that New York, on the other hand, had a policy
requiring a negligent driver to compensate his injured guest 78  On
the basis of the contacts and policies, the court held that New
York had the greatest concern and that its law applied to the issue
of the driver's liability to his injured guest for ordinary negligence.74
This decision shifted the primary focus away from the place of
injury test, although it remains one of the relevant factors to be
68 Ibid.
69 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283,240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
70 Defining "contacts" for purposes of applying the test has apparently produced
few real problems. Traditionally, contact points have been defined as the factual ele-
ments of a transaction that connect it with various jurisdictions. See voN MEHREN
& TRAuTMAN, THE LAw OF MuLTISTATE PROBLEMS 103 (1965).
71 12 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 191 NB.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
72The court stated, however, that because of a jurisdiction's interest in regulating
conduct within its borders, Ontario law would determine the issue of whether or not
the defendant's conduct was negligent. Id. at 482, 191 NX..2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
at 750.
78 Ibid.
74 Id. at 484, 191 NY.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
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considered in determining the choice of law.75 A close reading of
the Babcock opinion underscores the necessity for a fundamental
and exhaustive policy analysis. This is evident from the court's
determination that a distinction is necessary when considering the
question of host liability as opposed to his duty of care.76
With respect to the rights and liabilities which spring from
the host-guest relationship, the court asserted that such a relation-
ship should remain constant rather than change as the parties enter
or leave a particular jurisdiction.77 A practical consideration under-
lying this thesis involves the question of insurance and assumes
the host will obtain insurance protection that will be adequate
under the non-changing law where his insurer can calculate the pre-
mium commensurate with the risk.78
The Babcock concept elicits a rationale which on the surface
seems almost mechanical and quantitative but which is in fact an
excellent tool designed for flexibility. The initial step in its use
involves a determination of the contacts which a particular state
may have with the transaction. Such factors as the place of in-
jury, the domicile of the parties, and the place of the negligent
conduct will all be considered.79
Second, the court must determine the policy underlying the
law of each state to determine whether there is truly a conflict of
laws or whether only one state is affected. If this policy determina-
tion focuses only upon one party, then the law with that contact
would be applied. If the focus is upon more .than one, the court
must then weigh each accordingly. If it should occur that both
states' interests are equal, then a reversion to a jurisdictional-select-
ing rule can be utilized; for example, the law of the forum or the
law of the place of injury may be used.
B. A Source of Concern
The main criticism of the new approach is the charge that it
7 5 See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, THE LA W OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965).
76 See note 72 supra.
77 In Kilberg the court asserted that "modern conditions make it unjust and anoma-
lous to subject the traveling citizen of this State to the varying laws of other States
through and over which they move." 9 N.Y.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.
2d at 135.
78 See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in Conflicts of Laws - Toward a Theory of
Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 1, 69 YALE L.J. 595,
603 (1960).
79 See material cited note 88 infra.
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lacks certainty and predictability." It is said that the courts will
not be consistent in analyzing the various state interests and will
lead this already complex problem down the path to the swamp of
further confusion.81  Ironically, New York, the first state to give
impetus to the new theory, was the first to be subjected to this
accusation as a result of its decision in Dym v. Gordon.82 The
case was almost identical to Babcock in its operational facts. The
plaintiff and defendant were New York domiciliaries temporarily
residing in Colorado as summer students at the University of Colo-
rado. They had traveled to Colorado separately and had made no
prior arrangement that the plaintiff would ride in the defendanes
automobile, which like the vehicle in Babcock was registered and
insured in New York. The plaintiff, accepting a ride with the
defendant, was injured when the defendant failed to observe a stop
sign and collided with a Kansas driver.
Under Colorado law an automobile guest injured in an accident
is precluded from recovering damages from his driver unless the
accident is due to an intentional act on the part of the driver or
is caused by his negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct.83 Un-
der the applicable New York law, the passenger can recover if not
contributorily negligent."t The court, citing Babcock, held that
Colorado law applied, thus precluding recovery.85
The majority opinion evaluated the underlying policies as was
done in Babcock and concluded that Colorado had three which de-
served recognition: the protection of Colorado drivers and insur-
ance carriers against fraudulent claims; the granting of injured
parties in other cars priority in the assets of a negligent driver; and
the prevention of suits by ungrateful guests.8"  They asserted that
in light of these policies, the contacts gave Colorado the "greatest
concern" with the issue of the driver's liability for ordinary negli-
80 See Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S2.2d 288 (1963), where the court refused
to depart from the old rle and asserted: 'We do not deem it wise to voyage into
such an uncharted sea, leaving behind well established conflict of laws rules." Id. at
616, 129 S.E.2d at 293.
81 See Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson - A Practicing Attorney's Reflections Upon the
Opinion and Its Implications, 31 INS. COuNSEL J. 428 (1964).
82 16 N.Y.2d 120,209 N.E.2d 792,262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
83 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963).
8 4 E.g., Nelson v. Nygren, 259 N.Y. 71, 181 N.E. 52 (1932); Glendenning v. Feld,
285 App. Div. 604, 139 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 867, 131 N.E.2d
285 (1955).
85 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
86 Ibid.
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genceY Therefore, despite the common domicile of the parties,
the registration and insurance of the car, and despite New York's
policy of requiring a negligent driver to compensate his injured
passengers, the result opposite from that in Babcock was reached.88
The label of inconsistency has been applied to these two deci-
sions and is a source of much gratification to the critics of the
grouping of contacts method. On the surface there does appear
to be a direct conflict, and this argument has been made.8" How-
ever, the two cases can be distinguished on the operational fact of
87 Id. at 128, 209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
88 id. at 128, 209 NE.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470. While the "most significant
relationship" rule of the Restatement (Second) is similar to the "greatest concern" rule
of Babcock, the two rules are not identical. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 379-79a (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), which was cited in Babcock, states:
§ 379. The General Principle
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and lia-
bilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state
of most significant relationships include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place of busi-
ness of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is cen-
tered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will
consider the issues, the character of the tort and the relevant purposes
of the tort rules involved.
5 379a. Personal Injuries.
(1) When the actor's conduct and the personal injury occur in the same
state, the local law of this state determines, almost invariably, the rights
and liabilities of the parties.
Under Babcock's facts, the "important contacts" would be split 2-2. Although the
comments to § 379 state that the courts will consider the importance of the contacts
in the order listed, it still would be possible to apply New York law under the Tent.
Draft No. 8 rule by stressing § 379(3) and deemphasizing the comments and § 379a(1).
The result reached by the court of appeals in Dym could easily be reached under Tent.
Draft No. 8 since the contacts would be split 3-1 in favor of Colorado. Reaching
this result, however, would involve stressing the very parts (the comments and
5 379a(1) ) which would have to be deemphasized to reach the Babcock result. Under
Tent. Draft No. 9, promulgated after Babcock, it is easier to reach the Babcock result
and more difficult to reach the Dym result than it is under Tent. Draft No. 8. This
is true because § 379a is liberalized so that it provides only that the law of the place
of the wrong governs "unless some other state has a more significant relationship."
8Judge Fuld, the author of the Babcock opinion, dissented in Dym, stating that
he could see no material factual distinction between the two cases. He contended that
nothing turned on the place of formation of the host-guest relationship or upon the
fact that the parties were temporarily living in the foreign jurisdiction instead of simply
traveling through it as in Babcock. 16 N.Y.2d at 129-30, 209 N.E.2d at 797, 262
N.Y.S.2d at 471. Chief Judge Desmond's separate dissenting opinion stressed the need
to apply the New York public policy requiring a negligent driver to compensate his
injured passengers. Id. at 134, 209 N.E.2d at 800, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76. Judge
Bergan concurred with both dissenting opinions.
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residence. In Babcock the plaintiff and defendant left the state
together with the intent to return immediately to New York. This
in no way weakened the domicile state's interest. However, in
Dym, they left the permanent residence of New York separately
and established a temporary residence in Colorado while attending
school, thus giving Colorado a primary interest in the protection
of its temporary residents. The fact that the plaintiff and de-
fendant were residing in Colorado is easily distinguished from the
fortuitous presence of the parties in Babcock.9"
C. Extension of Babcock
Subsequent to Dym, New York extended the Babcock doctrine
to a wrongful death action in Long v. Pan Am. World Airways."'
The defendant New York corporation operated an air route be-
tween San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The
plaintiffs were the executors and administrators of the estate of two
passengers killed when the defendant's plane crashed in Maryland.
Both passengers were residents of Pennsylvania and had purchased
round-trip tickets there. Applying the Babcock principle, the court
found that Pennsylvania had the most significant contacts with the
decedent since the tickets were purchased there and the trip began
and was to have ended in Pennsylvania. 2
The court considered the place of injury, Maryland, as being
merely fortuitous and not sufficient of itself to justify the applica-
tion of that state's law to determine the existence of a cause of
action." In addition, the court asserted that the fact that the de-
fendant was incorporated in New York was also insufficient to
warrant either the application of New York substantive law or the
imposition of New York public policy."4 The court's rationale for
using Pennsylvania law in a wrongful death action was stated to
be consistent with its prior decisions in that "it would be highly
incongruous and unreal to have the flexible principle of Babcock
apply in a case where the victim is injured but not where he is
killed.""
90 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N..2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
91 16 N.Y2d 337, 213 N.E2d 796,266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
92Id. at 341, 213 N.-2d at 798, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
931d. at 342, 213 N.E.2d at 799, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
94 Id. at 342-43, 213 N.E.2d at 799, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
95Id. at 343, 213 NXE.2d at 799, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
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III. THE AFTERMATH OF BABCOCK:
RECENT IMPACT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
As a result of the New York decisions, other jurisdictions have
become vitally aware of the impact created by the new rationale.
The basic considerations expressed in these recent decisions are
parallel in that they overwhelmingly approve the evaluation of all
relevant factors in making a decision. The extent to which this
method will become feasible can only be determined after a case-
by-case analysis. However, even at this early stage, the most recent
cases illustrate that not only is this approach capable of consistent
application but also, and of even greater importance, it can be em-
ployed in almost any fact situation. The following discussion fo-
cuses primarily upon a number of these current cases from various
jurisdictions which have either heeded the Babcock mandate or
have considered it and have refused to employ its method. From
this it will be possible to project with some degree of accuracy
the far-reaching effect of this significant departure.
A. Delaware's Rejection
Now that the courts will be forced to give some consideration
to the grouping of contacts theory it will be interesting to see
what devices they utilize in making the decision to adopt or reject
the method. For example, in Friday v. Smoot,9" the Delaware
Supreme Court decided it was not within their discretion to make
an abrupt break with the past. The court indicated that its earlier
decisions had evidenced a strong public policy favoring the appli-
cation of the place of injury rule.9" In addition, the court asserted
that the application of the Babcock test with a slight variation in
the facts would lead to utter confusion," thus implying that using
96 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965). The case involved an action by a Delaware guest
against a Delaware host arising from an accident occurring in New Jersey. The plain-
tiff brought the action in Delaware, and the defendant invoked the Delaware guest
statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (1953), as a defense. New Jersey, the place
of the accident, had no guest statute.
97211 A.2d at 595. Clayton v. Bartoszewski, 198 A.2d 692 (Del. 1964); Park
v. Beech Aircraft, 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957).
9 8 The court considered a number of possibilities which it believed could not be
solved with any rational consistency: (1) If the parties were Delaware residents, but
the defendant had met the plaintiff in Pennsylvania and invited him to go to New
Jersey (the place of injury); (2) if the defendant were a Delaware resident and in-
vited a New Jersey resident by telephone to take the trip and then proceed to cross
the Delaware River, pick up the plaintiff in New Jersey where the accident occurs;
and (3) if in the instant case, other passengers were present from Maryland and
were picked up in Maryland. 211 A.2d at 596-97.
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the grouping of contacts in this setting would result in a justifiable
decision, but future problems encountered might be of greater com-
plexity and their resolutions not as simple.99
B. Grouping of Contacts: Damages and Immunity
The adherence to the rule of stare decisis is perhaps the greatest
obstacle to the advancement of the grouping of contacts theory.' 0
However, the gradual momentum which this theory has gained in
recent years illustrates that the barrier is not insurmountable. In-
variably, opinions which favor its adoption make an express state-
ment recognizing that their rejection of the prevailing view is an
abrupt departure from precedent. Pennsylvania, one of the first
jurisdictions to follow New York's rejection of the old view, an-
nounced its adoption of the grouping of contacts theory in Grif-
fith v. United Airlines, Inc. i°1 It is significant to note that this
case differed from both Babcock and Dym in that it involved the
question of damages, whereas the two former cases involved the
applicability of guest statutes. The cause of action in Griffith arose
from an airplane crash which occurred in the course of a scheduled
landing in Denver, Colorado. Colorado law limits the amount of
recovery in wrongful death actions, whereas Pennsylvania, the resi-
dence of the deceased, placed no ceiling on recoverable damages.
The court considered the various contacts and evaluated the policies
of both Pennsylvania and Colorado, concluding that Colorado, the
place of injury, had no real interest in the outcome of the litiga-
tion. The court felt that Pennsylvania's interests were far su-
perior since the relationship arose in Pennsylvania and that state
was vitally concerned with the administration of decedent's estates
and the subsequent well-being of its dependents.' For these rea-
sons the court held that the Colorado limitation should not apply
and permitted the issue of damages to go to the jury. A vigorous
99 The court concluded that a departure from the place of injury rule would re-
sult in the judicial encouragement of litigation not now open to litigants and that
such a change must be made by the legislature. Id. at 597.
100 See CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF TBE LAW (1924).
101 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
10 2 The interest Colorado might have had with respect to its creditors was minimal
since the death was instantaneous. Similarly, Colorado's policy of limiting damages
to prevent a jury from speculating would not be affected if a Pennsylvania court per-
mitted speculation. Id. at 24, 203 A.2d at 807. In addition, the limitation seeks to
protect a Colorado defendant, but such protection is not applicable here since the air-
line was not a Colorado domiciliary. Ibid.
103 Id. at 24-25, 203 A.2d at 807.
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dissent objected to the determination, stating that it would not
have changed the existing law.104
In a very recent case, 1'0 this same court was faced with a sepa-
rate and distinct question which centered about the right of one
spouse to sue another. The defendant husband was driving his
family from the West Coast to their Pennsylvania domicile, and
while in Colorado an accident occurred in which their child was
killed. The wife brought suit in a Pennsylvania forum under the
Colorado wrongful death act.0 6 Pennsylvania prohibited suits be-
tween spouses, however, such suits are permitted in Colorado. The
court examined the prohibition and considered it to be expressive
of Pennsylvania's interest in foreclosing litigation which tends to
engender friction between spouses.0 7 However, Colorado, by per-
mitting these suits, expressed an interest in providing redress for an
injured spouse even if obtained at the expense of marital harmony.
As in Griffith,' Pennsylvania rather than Colorado domiciliaries
were to be affected, and therefore the issue relevant to marital
status was of concern only to Pennsylvania.0 9
C. Other Applications: Flexibility
In addition to New York and Pennsylvania, several other states
have incorporated grouping of contacts in their conflict of laws
principles. It is interesting to note the rationale employed by these
jurisdictions in seeking to implement the new approach, for their
patterns are similar and surprisingly consistent. Wisconsin has
emerged from its prior adherence to the traditional view by a
gradual process much the same as that of New York. Like the
Kilberg decision in New York which employed a substantive-pro-
cedural characterization device to avoid the place of injury rule,"0
104 Id. at 25, 203 A.2d at 807.
10 5 McSwaia v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
106 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-2 (1963).
107 420 Pa. at 95, 215 A.2d at 682. See Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
108 Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
10 9 The recent Pennsylvania case of Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d
897 (1966) applied Pennsylvania law to permit recovery based upon simple negli-
gence, as opposed to Georgia law, the place of the injury, which required a showing
of gross negligence before recovery would be permitted. It is interesting to note that
the trial court had initially applied Georgia law but reversed itself subsequent to
the Griffith decision, thus rejecting the inflexible place of injury test.
110 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.-
2d 17 (1962).
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the decision of Haumshield v. Continental Cas. Co."' in Wisconsin
utilized the characterization process to circumvent the rigid rule.
Later, the same court made reference to the recent trend toward a
less mechanical application of the choice of law rule.112 Then in
Brunke v. Popp,"' the same court for the first time referred to
Babcock, although holding that it would not apply since both
parties were not residents of Wisconsin." 4  These cases foreshad-
owed the future adoption of the grouping of contacts theory which
soon followed in Wilcox v. Wilcox"' - the Wisconsin parallel
to New York's Babcock decision. Wilcox added impetus to the
concepts embodied in the new theory and proved consistent with
the Babcock analysis, since the two cases involved similar fact situa-
tions.11
Ill 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
112 Woliak v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 120 N.W.2d 47, read
on other grounds on rehearing, 19 Wis. 2d 224, 122 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
"13 21 Wis. 2d 458, 124 N.W.2d 642 (1963).
"14 Id. at 462 n.1, 124 N.W.2d at 644 n1. See Parchia v. Parchia, 24 Wis. 2d
659, 130 N.W.2d 205 (1964), refusing to follow the "grouping of contacts" theory
due to procedural technicalities.
115 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
118 The plaintiff and defendant, residents of Wisconsin, were involved in an acci-
dent in Nebraska while returning from a vacation. The plaintiff brought suit in Wis-
consin, alleging negligence; the defendant claimed immunity, asserting that the Ne-
braska guest statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740 (1943), should apply. Wisconsin
permits a suit by a guest against his host driver for ordinary negligence. Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 631, 133 N.W.2d 408, 415 (1965). The court reasoned
that the forum should not apply law repugnant to its own policy, id. at 634, 133 N.W.2d
at 416, and then analyzed the policy of each state concerned to determine which had
the most significant concern with the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 634, 133 N.W.-
2d at 417. The issue basically focused on the liability of a Wisconsin host for injuries
to his Wisconsin guest. The plaintiffs were both residents of Wisconsin; their trip
commenced and was to end in Wisconsin; the insurance coverage was issued and
delivered in Wisconsin by a Wisconsin carrier which covered an automobile licensed,
garaged, and operated in Wisconsin. Ibid. By contrast, Nebraska's sole contact with
the case was the fact that the accident occurred there. The contacts were then evalu-
ated in the light of the host-guest policies of the two states. The policy of Wisconsin
is to permit recovery against the host, whereas the purpose of the Nebraska statute was
the prevention of suits by ungrateful guests and the prevention of collusive suits. Id.
at 632, 133 N.W.2d at 416. Therefore, only Wisconsin law would be affected due
to the presence of the Wisconsin guest. The court went on to say that this weighing
of interests approach could be utilized with every issue before the court, and thus the
law of several jurisdictions could apply in any one case involving multi-state contacts.
There have been two unreported decisions applying the Wilcox analysis. In Cas-
tonzo v. General Cas. Co., Civil No. 3556, W.D. Wis., March 15, 1966, an Illinois
host and an Illinois guest were involved in a Wisconsin accident with a Wisconsin
driver. The host and guest sued the Wisconsin driver, and the driver counterclaimed
for damages from the Illinois host. The host moved for summary judgment, dismiss-
ing the counterclaim for contribution.
The court held that it was necessary to determine whether the host could be held
liable to the guest, that is, whether the llinois or Wisconsin host-guest rule applied.
Following the Wilcox analysis, the court found two policies underlying the Illinois
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Wilcox illustrates a consistency with the Babcock approach
which is significant in the light of the often-stated criticism that
the New York theory will lead to confusion." 7  Furthermore, if
it can be assumed that Babcock is consistent with Dym,"8 it is
apparent that the New Hampshire decisions have also followed the
New York courts.
In Dow v. Larrabee,"9 the New Hampshire court was faced
with the same situation found in the prior Dym decision arising in
New York.2 ' The court asserted that traditionally New Hamp-
shire has applied the law of the place of injury to determine the
liability of a defendant, 2 ' in this case the place of injury would be
Massachusetts.' 22 The court then referred to its 1966 decision in
Johnson v. Johnson' which had adopted the "grouping of con-
rule. The first, to protect the courts from collusive host-guest suits, was held not
applicable, since Wisconsin was the forum. The second, to insulate a generous host
from claims by his guests, was held to apply, since "the protection should continue
through the relatively brief Wisconsin . . . trip." Ibid. Underlying the Wisconsin
rule, the court held, were two factors. First, was a conclusion (contrary to that of
Illinois) that a guest should be able to rely on his host's care. Since an Illinois host
and guest were concerned, Illinois policy was held to prevail. Second, medical services
rendered to an injured guest should not be borne by the public or by those who fur-
nish them. Since the injured party was domiciled in Illinois, the risk to Wisconsin
medical facilities and public funds was limited, and the Wisconsin interest was held
not entitled to recognition. The court thus concluded, "there is a true conflict be-
tween... one or more Illinois policies and one or more Wisconsin policies."
A subsequent case, Magid v. Decker, Civil No. C 65-88, W.D. Wis., March 18,
1966, considered the issue of interspousal immunity. Wisconsin permits a wife to sue
her husband; Illinois does not. Rejecting the assertion that any policy of deterrence
was involved, the court held that the underlying policy of the Wisconsin rule was to
emancipate married women. The policies of both the Wisconsin and Illinois rules,
the court observed, "stem from considerations involving the family, the marriage rela-
tionship, and the dignity of a married woman." Ibid. Consequently, the law of the
state of domicile was applied.
117 See White v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 39 Misc. 2d 678, 241 N.Y.S.2d
566 (Sup. Ct. 1963), in which the exact reverse of the situation in Babcock was present
and the court reached a consistent result.
118 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
119 217 A.2d 506 (N.H. 1966).
120 The action was brought by a minor guest for injuries sustained when he fell
from the back seat of the host's automobile onto the highway while the car was still
in motion. The injuries were sustained in Massachusetts as the child was being re-
turned from a visit with friends in that state. The defendant driver had offered to
transport the mother from New Hampshire to Massachusetts to pick up the child and
then return.
121 Id. at 507. This view was expressed in Beacham v. Proprietors of Portsmouth
Bridge, 68 N.H. 382, 40 Ad. 1066 (1895).
122 See McAllister v. Maltais, 102 N.H. 245, 154 A.2d 456 (1959), decided in a
jurisdiction in which a driver can be held liable to a guest for gross negligence only.
123 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
[Vol. 18: 938
CONFLICT OF LAWS
tacts" theory to apply the law of the domicile in determining the
question of the suability of spouses.'24
The majority in Dow went on to say that domicile is important
where intra-family relations are involved but distinguished that
relationship from the host-guest situation.'25  It concluded that the
interest Massachusetts had in regulating the standards of behavior
of persons traveling upon its highways and the consequent liability
which shall result from injuries suffered there is more significantly
related to the instant case. The parties were traveling on a Massa-
chusetts highway and had entered into the host-guest relationship
in Massachusetts. 2 ' Therefore, like Dym in New York, the New
Hampshire court found significance in the fact that -the relationship
arose apart from the place of residence, therefore lessening that
state's interest.'
In a slightly different context, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Batts v. Balts' applied the grouping of contacts theory to an-
other phase of family immunity. The question involved the right
of a parent to sue his child for the alleged negligence of that child.
The court found support in McSwain v. McSwaiWz29 which had
applied the law of the domicile to the essentially family law prob-
lem of the suability of spouses. This same court'e" when faced
with a conflict between a foreign guest statute' 8 ' and its own law
permitting recovery based on ordinary negligence, followed the
124 Ibid.
1 2 5 The court in Dow stated: "The relationship of host and guest however is usually
temporary and fleeting, and its incidents of minor consequence as compared with those
of marriage or parenthood." 217 A.2d at 508.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid. See also Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966).
128 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966). The injury occurred while the parties were
traveling in Wisconsin, and the action was commenced in a Minnesota forum. Wis-
consin law would not permit the suit, Schwenkhioff v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 11
Wis. 2d 97, 104 N.W.2d 154 (1960) (by analogy) (unemancipated minor cannot sue
parent for negligence); Fiduciary Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613
(1948), but this case established that such suits are permissible. Therefore, the conflict
arose as to which law should be applied to the facts after a consideration of the relevant
policies and interests of the respective states. All the parties lived in Minnesota and
resided in the same household. The trip started and was to end in Wisconsin, and the
car was registered, insured, and garaged in Minnesota. Whatever impact the litigation
had would only affect the Minnesota family and the Minnesota insurer. By contrast,
Wisconsin's interest was said to be merely to enforce its traffic laws and to promote
highway safety. The court considered this last factor and felt that such interest would
indeed be promoted, not hampered, by applying Minnesota law which would impose
civil liability on the negligent driver in Wisconsin. 142 N.W.2d at 70.
120 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
1a0 Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 141 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1966).
'21 S.D. CODE § 44.0362 (1939).
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Babcock line of reasoning. Stressing reliance on the Balts decision,
the court enumerated the contacts"3 2 which centered in Minnesota
and said that it would be fair to assume that the owner of the car
sought -to protect his passengers against negligent injury in what-
ever state an accident might arise. In addition, the application of
the Minnesota law would insure the collection of whatever medical
bills had arisen in South Dakota, the place of injury.183
IV. OTHER CRITERIA FOR CHOICE OF LAW
It is apparent from the discussion of the cases above that the
flexibility of the new theory introduced by New York courts per-
mits its application in many diverse areas of multi-state conflicts.
In addition to the cases already analyzed, the grouping of contacts
has been applied to establish the liability of an insurer for breach
of a duty to the insured,' the applicability of a statute of limita-
tions,'85 and in the area of defamation.' Such adoption indicates
a judicial acceptance of a rule which should prove equitable and
just.
As can be readily seen, the subject of conflict of laws is broad
enough to permit varying criteria for the choice of law.'87 The
place of injury is still the prevailing view, although the grouping
of contacts theory has acquired recognition in several jurisdic-
dons 8 and the support of many experts in the field. In addition,
a number of commentators who do not themselves espouse the
grouping of contacts theory would substitute the place of injury
rule for one closer to the flexible Babcock rule. 8' Professor Brain-
erd Currie, for instance, advocates a governmental interest theory40
182 141 N.W.2d at 523.
133 Id. at 528.
18 4 See Tepeyac v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1965) (suit against
insurer for breach of duty to defend or settle).
135 See George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1964).
136 See Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 P. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill.
1959).
13 7 At the time this article went to press, the highest courts in Illinois, Iowa, Min-
nesota, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin had rejected the
lex loci delicti approach and had adopted the grouping of contacts theory.
138 Baits v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966); Dow v. Larrabee, 217 A.2d 506
(N.H. 1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
139 See Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 138.
140 See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1233 (1963).
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which requires the forum to apply its own law if it has any legiti-
mate interest. The lex loci should thus be applied only if the
forum has no interest at all. He urges that if the forum state has
no legitimate interest and if other states have competing interests
then the law of the forum should govern.'41 Professor Ehren-
zweig,' like Professor Currie, stresses the application of the law
of the forum 43 but emphasizes the interests of the parties as op-
posed to governmental interests. With this premise he looks in
each situation to the development of a common law of conflicts
based on "consistent judicial practice" to provide exceptions to the
basic rule. He envisages that this approach will actually promote
application of foreign law and relegate the lex fori to mere "ana-
lytical primacy"'" because deviations will not occur, in his view,
except where "compelling reasons"'4 5 for such deviations exist.
Professor Russell Weintraub 4' suggests that the first determina-
tion by the court must be whether the conflict is in fact real or
spurious. 47 If no conflict is found, then the law of the forum
should be applied. Once a conflict is found, he suggests that the
actor be found liable for his conduct under the laws of any state
whose interests would be advanced significantly by imposing lia-
bility unless its imposition would unfairly surprise the actor. 48
His final suggestion is that when the policies of the interested or
contact states are not applicable to the case before the court, then
the forum state should consider arriving at a result that would in-
sulate the outcome from the selection of the forum so as to prevent
future actions from being decided merely by the choice of the
forum. '4 This final step would answer the forum-shopping criti-
14, Id. at 1243.
1 42 See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws - Towards a Theory
oi Enterpise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 1, 69 YALE L.J. 595
(1960).
148 Ibid.
144 Commen; The Second Conflicts Restatemernt of Torts: A- Caveat, 51 CALIF. L.
REV. 762, 782-83 (1963).
145 Ibid.
146 See Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems - Torts, 48 CORELL
L.Q. 215 (1963).
147 Id. at 216. A real conflict concerns a situation which, when analyzed in terms
of policy, shows that the policies of more than one state are affected by the outcome;
a spurious conflict concerns a situation which may appear to create a conflict but which,
after analysis of the policies of the states involved, demonstrates that only the policy of
one state is affected.
148 Id. at 249.
149 Id. at 249-5 0.
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cism leveled at the recent trend. 5' Professor Morris'5 ' believes
that a tort action should be governed by its "proper law," that is,
the law or laws by which the parties intended or may fairly be
presumed to have intended the action to be governed. Professor
Cook 52 states that where the negligent act occurs in one state and
the injury takes place in another state, the forum should choose the
law of the state where the decisive portion of the events have oc-
curred.
V. A FINAL CONSIDERATION
An examination of the grouping of contacts approach should
illuminate some of the problems which might cast doubt upon the
overwhelming approval given this departure. For example, in Bab-
cock it might be assumed that the court actually made a prede-
termined subjective judgment that its laws and policies were far
superior to that of any other state, and the fact that the court re-
ferred to liability insurance raises the question of whether this factor
should ever be relevant with respect to the substantive rights of the
parties.
Again, the question of flexibility, as opposed to predictability,
must await further determination. It can be seen that when many
variables enter the picture, an infinite number of permutations are
possible. As a result, the human mechanism may easily arrive at a
different result when given a similar pattern of circumstances; how-
ever, with the vested rights approach, this problem is avoided. Thus,
two judges sitting in separate jurisdictions and faced with the same
facts will be guided by the same process.
Yet, there is reason and logic to support the grouping of con-
tacts theory which should dispel the fears of uncertainty and unpre-
dictability. The vested rights approach is merely a mechanical de-
vice employed to establish the initial guidelines for the court. This
immediate determination requires the court to automatically look
to the place of injury and apply that law, leaving the somewhat
academic question as to the content of that law. Once this step is
taken, substantive rights become fixed, unyielding, and perhaps un-
just in the light of the circumstances of the individual case. The
150 See Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156
(1930).
151 See Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1951).




parties are thus deprived of the benefit of the court's discretion as
to whether it is advisable to follow the dictates of the predeter-
mined law. The grouping of contacts theory does not reject the
place of injury as a possible source for determining the substantive
rights involved, for it remains one of the considerations which must
be taken into account.
The lack of certainty argument in opposition to the grouping of
contacts theory is not persuasive since it focuses merely on the
predictability of a lawsuit. This reasoning ignores the fact that the
purpose of litigation is to weigh the contesting views of the parties.
A court must seek to establish a just result with all the facts before
it. An approach which stresses the geography of the situation in-
volves the danger of having a fortuitous event become the sole
criterion in the determination of liability. This risk is considerably
reduced if the approach encompasses all significant contacts which
are then evaluated in conjunction with the fortuitous event.
Any possible uncertainty that is inherent in this new theory of
conflicts, as opposed to the mechanical rule of lex loci delicti, should
be outweighed by the judicial flexibility and the concomitant pro-
motion of justice which the grouping of contacts theory has intro-
duced.
NORBERT H. RASCHER, JR.
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